In 2016, when Donald Trump first shouted "America First," John Kachani was a firm believer. He ran a large wholesale company in California and was one of the largest suppliers to U.S. dollar stores. His creed was simple: American goods are the best, and buying American is patriotic.
Eight years later. Today, over half of his procurement list comes from China.
This story isn't just his alone.
From Dollar Stores to "Made in China"
Kachani's company, Concord Enterprises, had a simple business model: source cheap goods from various places and supply them to discount stores across America. In the past, his sourcing was scattered—Walmart clearance sales, small U.S. factories, Mexican suppliers—a little bit of everything.
The turning point came in 2018. When Trump imposed the first round of tariffs on China, Kachani assumed it would push him toward U.S. suppliers. But reality delivered a slap in the face:
America simply didn't make what he needed.
He needed mass quantities of small items—toothbrushes, notebooks, toys, kitchen gadgets. American factories either no longer made them, or made them too expensive and too slow.
Kachani's experience was later documented by the media: "For the past 20 years, I've been buying cheap products from Chinese factories and exporting them to the U.S. Now I want to sell American-made goods to China."—Even he admitted that the value-for-money of Chinese goods was unstoppable.
Why Did "American-Made" Lose?
Kachani did the math. A 500ml bottle of shampoo cost 49 cents if made in China, while the American-made version sold for 69 cents in China. In the Chinese market, American products barely stayed competitive—relying on the "Made in the U.S.A." brand premium.
But in the U.S. domestic market, the same logic worked in reverse—Chinese products offered comparable quality at a significantly lower price. Why wouldn't you buy them?
More critically, there was the supply chain. Kachani found that Chinese factories responded several times faster than their American counterparts. "From drawing to sample, Chinese factories can respond within 72 hours." Philip Richardson, a U.S. buyer who had been sourcing at the Canton Fair for over two decades, shared the same view: "A strong sense of responsibility for the product is the biggest characteristic of Chinese suppliers. They can strictly control quality and ensure high-quality delivery."
The New Generation of U.S. Buyers: Actively Embracing China's Supply Chain
If Kachani's generation was "forced to turn to China," the new generation of U.S. buyers is "actively embracing China."
Isaac Hertzroni is a second-generation Canton Fair buyer—his father had started sourcing there twenty years ago. Today, he runs his own global sourcing company, with approximately 50% of his supply chain coming from China.
"The rapid development of China's industrial and supply chains has brought us higher-quality Chinese goods and more efficient delivery," said Isaac.
He finds Chinese suppliers through the Canton Fair and uses digital tools to remotely manage production, quality control, and shipping. "Now I can close an order in half an hour."
Another U.S. buyer, Philip Richardson, took it even further. He attended his first Canton Fair in 1998 and, in 2004, set up a company in Guangzhou—putting production directly in China. "From factory loading to U.S. store shelves takes at most one month. With such fast shipping, we often can't keep up with demand."
A Dependency That Tariffs Cannot Break
In 2026, U.S.-China tariffs remain high. But U.S. buyers have not left China.
A typical example is Ding Ken. He runs four hotels in the U.S. and has sourced all supplies from China since 2008. In early 2026, when Trump imposed reciprocal tariffs, he agonized over whether to "ship or not ship"—tariffs on one container jumped from $70,000 to over $1 million, exceeding the value of the goods themselves.
But he didn't switch suppliers. Because of the unbeatable value, stable quality, and mature supply chain—all lessons his father had accumulated over years of experience.
After the U.S.-China Geneva trade talks in May 2025, Ding immediately cut his vacation short and rushed back to China to continue sourcing. For him, the value of China's supply chain far outweighed the added cost of tariffs.
The Real Business Logic
Looking across the experiences of these U.S. wholesalers, a few clear patterns emerge:
First, it's not that they don't want to buy American—it's that America doesn't make it.
"American factories either stopped making them, or made them too expensive and too slow." This isn't a political issue—it's an issue of industrial hollowing-out.
Second, China's supply chain advantage is systematic.
From 72-hour prototyping to stable large-scale delivery, from complete industrial clusters to mature export systems—this isn't about one factory; it's about an entire ecosystem.
Third, tariff costs can be absorbed, but supply chains cannot be replaced.
Ding Ken was willing to pay an extra $1 million in tariffs per container because the cost and risk of "switching suppliers" were even higher. Isaac Hertzroni and Philip Richardson moved their production lines—even their companies—to China because doing business there was simply more efficient.
Kachani once wanted to "sell American goods to China." But today, his business still cannot do without China's supply chain—not because he doesn't want to buy American, but because America's manufacturing ecosystem is no longer what it used to be.
"Chinese manufacturing enriches global market supply," said Philip Richardson. "Partnering with China means partnering with opportunity."
That's not just a slogan. It's a vote cast with real money by U.S. wholesalers.
