On September 28, China and the U.S. published their "$30 billion vs. $30 billion" tariff reduction lists. Agricultural products were the absolute mainstay of China's list—corn, wheat, sorghum, meat, dairy, vegetable oils, and even soybean oil and soybean meal made the cut.
Only whole soybeans were conspicuously absent.
The American Soybean Association expressed its "disappointment" that same day. Soybean futures on the Chicago Board of Trade fell 2.3% in response. American soybean farmers waited months for "good news"—and got a "half-open door" instead.
Why soybeans, of all things? The answer lies in two numbers: 13% and 25%.
Currently, U.S. soybeans entering China face a combined tax burden of 13%—a 3% Most-Favored-Nation rate plus a 10% reciprocal countermeasure tariff.
That extra 10% is the chip China is keeping on the table.
Traders warn that this rate is "too high for private crushing companies to absorb." The landed cost of U.S. soybeans works out to roughly the same as Brazilian soybeans—but Brazilian beans have higher oil and protein content, making them more cost-effective. For Chinese private crushers, buying U.S. beans is essentially running at a negative margin.
In other words, as long as that 10% stays in place, U.S. soybeans hold no appeal for Chinese private buyers. The only ones buying are state-owned buyers like Sinograin and COFCO.
The reason soybeans are being "treated differently" traces back to 2018.
That year, the U.S. imposed tariffs on Chinese goods, and China retaliated with a 25% tariff on U.S. soybeans. The effect was immediate: from October 2018 to March 2019, China's imports of U.S. soybeans were less than one-ninth of the same period the previous year.
American soybean farmers took a heavy hit. Illinois lost $1.2 billion; Iowa lost $1.2 billion. The U.S. government was forced to roll out two rounds of agricultural bailouts totaling **$28 billion**, including $7 billion in direct subsidies specifically for soybeans.
This exchange taught both sides one thing: soybeans are America's agricultural soft spot—and China's best countermeasure tool.
Half of U.S. soybean exports depend on the Chinese market. If China doesn't buy, the U.S. can't find another buyer to absorb that volume. But if China doesn't buy American soybeans, it can buy Brazilian ones. In 2025, Brazil accounted for 71% of China's soybean imports.
Ker Gibbs, former president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai, put it precisely to Fortune magazine: by excluding soybeans from the tariff cut list, China is "leaving a half-open door."
The door isn't slammed shut—soybean oil, soybean meal, and soybean seeds are all on the tariff cut list, signaling that China doesn't intend to sever soybean trade entirely. But for whole soybeans, the door is only cracked open.
Why leave that crack?
First, to keep negotiating chips. Usha Haley, a professor at Wichita State University, said: "They're offering enough to show they're moving things forward, but they always keep some cards—economic and political—for the next round of talks." Before the U.S. midterm elections, the soybean card is especially sensitive for the Trump administration.
Second, state-owned buyers keep buying—private buyers wait. Sinograin and COFCO have already purchased over 12 million tons of U.S. soybeans, nearly half of the White House's claimed annual commitment of 25 million tons. But these are state purchases, which don't rely on tariff relief. Arlan Suderman, chief commodities economist at StoneX, analyzed: "State-owned buyers can buy and crush—they don't need tariff cuts at all, because they essentially don't pay the tax. Keep that card, and talk again in a few months."
First, soybeans' "political attribute" far outweighs their "commercial attribute." They're no longer just an agricultural commodity—they're a thermometer for U.S.-China relations. Whether tariffs get cut depends on political timing, not market supply and demand.
Second, the tariff cuts on soybean oil and meal are a pragmatic signal. China needs soybean meal to feed pigs and soybean oil to cook with. Whole soybean tariffs can serve as a bargaining chip, but processed product supply cannot be cut off. This shows China has drawn a clear line between "keeping chips" and "safeguarding livelihoods."
Third, the window for private crushers hasn't opened yet. As long as the 10% additional tariff remains, importing U.S. beans makes no economic sense for private companies. Those wanting to participate in this trade wave either wait for tariff adjustments or go through state-owned channels.
Soybeans not making the list isn't an oversight—it's by design. China used one list to tell the U.S.: I'll buy your corn, your pork, your dairy. But the soybean card? I'm not done playing it yet.
